Darfur's Reckoning

The Genesis of a Crisis

The vast, arid region of Darfur in western Sudan, historically a crossroads of cultures and trade, has long been a landscape of complex intercommunal relationships. ²⁰ For centuries, a delicate equilibrium existed between the region's diverse ethnic groups, broadly categorised as those of African and Arab descent. ²³ This balance, however, began to fray in the latter half of the 20th century, strained by a confluence of environmental pressures and political machinations. ¹³ Recurrent droughts, most notably a severe famine in 1984, intensified competition for scarce resources, particularly water and grazing land, between the predominantly pastoralist Arab communities and the largely sedentary agriculturalist African groups, such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. ^{13, 20}

These environmental tensions were exacerbated by a history of political and economic marginalisation of Darfur by the central government in Khartoum. ^{13, 16} The region, geographically and culturally distant from the centres of power, suffered from chronic underdevelopment and a lack of representation in national governance. ^{10, 32} This sense of neglect fostered deep-seated grievances among the non-Arab populations of Darfur, who felt systematically excluded from the nation's political and economic life. ¹⁰ The rise of an Arab-centric Islamist government in Khartoum following a military coup in 1989 further entrenched these divisions, promoting a political ideology that favoured Arab identity and culture. ²¹

The simmering resentments in Darfur eventually boiled over into open rebellion in February 2003. ^{2, 16} Two newly formed rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), launched a series of attacks against government installations. ^{2, 10} Their stated aims were to end the region's marginalisation and secure a more equitable distribution of power and resources. ^{10, 16} The initial successes of the rebellion, including a daring raid on the airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, in April 2003, caught the Sudanese government by surprise and demonstrated the rebels' military capabilities. ^{2, 21}

The Unleashing of the Janjaweed

Faced with a burgeoning insurgency, the government of then-President Omar al-Bashir adopted a brutal counter-insurgency strategy. ¹⁸ Rather than relying solely on the national army, the government armed and supported local Arab militias, which came to be known as the Janjaweed. ^{10, 18} The term, often translated as "devils on horseback," would become synonymous with a campaign of terror that would engulf Darfur. ³⁴ The Janjaweed, drawn largely from nomadic Arab tribes, were given a free hand to crush the rebellion, with the government providing them with weapons, logistical support, and, crucially, impunity. ^{16, 23}

The ensuing conflict was characterised by a scorched-earth policy targeting the civilian populations from which the rebel groups drew their support. ^{8, 23} The modus operandi of the Janjaweed was chillingly consistent. ³⁴ Attacks on villages often began with aerial bombardments by the Sudanese air force, followed by ground assaults by the mounted militias. ³⁴ The Janjaweed would sweep into communities, killing men, raping women, and destroying homes, crops, and water sources. ^{8, 34} This systematic violence was designed not only to defeat the rebels but also to terrorise and displace the civilian population, effectively erasing their presence from the land. ⁸

The atrocities committed by the Janjaweed were widespread and horrific. ³⁶ Eyewitnesses and survivors recounted tales of mass executions, torture, and the systematic use of rape as a weapon of war. ^{5, 30} The violence was explicitly ethnic in nature, with attackers often using racial slurs and declaring their intention to cleanse the land of its non-Arab inhabitants. ²⁵ The United Nations estimates that by the mid-2000s, the conflict had resulted in the deaths of some 300,000 people and the displacement of over 2.5 million more. ^{3, 5} Many of those who fled their homes sought refuge in sprawling, squalid camps for internally displaced persons within Darfur or crossed the border into neighbouring Chad. ^{10, 27}

The International Response and the Path to Justice

The international community was slow to react to the unfolding crisis in Darfur. ¹⁹ The remoteness of the region and restrictions on access imposed by the Sudanese government meant that information about the scale of the atrocities was initially scarce. ¹⁹ However, as reports from human rights organisations and journalists began to emerge, the world was confronted with the horrifying reality of the situation. ¹⁵ In 2004, the United States government declared the violence in Darfur to be an act of genocide, a position that was not universally adopted but which significantly raised the international profile of the conflict. ^{8, 16}

Despite the growing international outcry, meaningful action to halt the violence was limited. ²⁴ The African Union deployed a peacekeeping mission to Darfur, but it was under-resourced and lacked a mandate to effectively protect civilians. ³⁴ The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling on the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed and bring those responsible for the atrocities to justice, but these calls were largely ignored. ¹⁷

In a significant step towards accountability, the United Nations Security Council, in March 2005, referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC). ^{14, 16} This was a landmark decision, as it gave the ICC jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed in Darfur, even though Sudan is not a state party to the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the court. ¹⁴ The ICC's Office of the Prosecutor subsequently opened an investigation and, in 2007, issued arrest warrants for several individuals, including Ali Kushayb. ²³

The Trial of Ali Kushayb

Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman, widely known by his nom de guerre Ali Kushayb, was a senior commander in the Janjaweed militia and a pivotal figure in the campaign of violence in Darfur. ^{4, 9} He was accused of personally participating in and ordering his forces to commit a litany of atrocities. ³ For years, he evaded capture, but in June 2020, he voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities in the Central African Republic and was transferred to the custody of the ICC. ^{6, 9}

His trial, which commenced in April 2022, was the first before the ICC for crimes committed in Darfur. ^{4, 6} The prosecution presented a vast body of evidence, including the testimony of 56 witnesses, who provided harrowing accounts of the violence they had endured and witnessed. ^{4, 7} Survivors described mass killings, gang rapes, and the systematic destruction of their communities. ⁵ One witness recounted how Abd-al-Rahman had ordered his men to "repeat" their abuses in case they had missed anyone. ^{4, 5}

The defence argued that Abd-al-Rahman was not the man known as Ali Kushayb and that he had no involvement in the conflict. ⁴ However, the judges rejected this defence, noting that he had even identified himself by his name and nickname in a video when he surrendered. ⁹ The court found that Abd-al-Rahman was a key figure in the implementation of the government's counter-insurgency strategy, which involved the systematic targeting of civilians. ⁴

The Verdict and its Implications

On the 6th of October 2025, the International Criminal Court delivered its verdict, finding Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman guilty on 27 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. ^{3, 12} These included murder, rape, torture, persecution, and forcible transfer of population. ^{5, 11} The presiding judge, Joanna Korner, read out the unanimous verdicts, detailing the court's findings that Abd-al-Rahman had not only given orders but had also been personally involved in the beatings and executions of civilians. ^{3, 4} The court concluded that the atrocities were part of a government plan to violently suppress the rebellion in Darfur. ^{4, 7}

The conviction of Ali Kushayb is a momentous development in the long and arduous quest for justice for the victims of the Darfur conflict. ⁹ It is the first time that a senior Janjaweed leader has been held accountable for the horrific crimes committed in the region. ^{3, 4} For the survivors and the families of the victims, the verdict represents a long-awaited acknowledgement of their suffering and a step towards closure. ⁹

The conviction also sends a powerful message to perpetrators of mass atrocities worldwide that they cannot act with impunity. ⁹ It reaffirms the crucial role of the International Criminal Court in upholding international law and ensuring that those who commit the most serious crimes are brought to justice. ¹¹

However, the path to full accountability for the crimes committed in Darfur is far from over. ³ Former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who is also wanted by the ICC on charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, remains at large. ^{3, 4} The current political instability and ongoing conflict in Sudan present significant challenges to the pursuit of further prosecutions. ^{5, 28}

The verdict against Ali Kushayb is a testament to the resilience of the victims and the tireless efforts of those who have sought to bring the perpetrators of the Darfur atrocities to justice. ¹² It is a landmark achievement for international criminal law and a beacon of hope for a future where such crimes are no longer tolerated. ⁹ The sentencing of Abd-al-Rahman, which will take place at a later date, will be another crucial step in this long and difficult journey. ^{3, 4}